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SYMPOSIUM PROCEEDINGS
PROF. WOLFMAN (MODERATOR): Thank you ever so much, Gerry.
I am reminded by what Judge Parker and Gerry Brannon said to
relate a case that was before the Tax Court. Gerry referred to the
notion that we have, that we tax only money income, that we
don't tax in-kind income, and Judge Parker alluded to some of the
problems of cases they have before them-the number of shelter
cases. Of course, she was alluding, without direct reference, to
these tax protester cases that they have-that are designed by
people who want to send the tax system crashing. There were a
group of such cases in which taxpayers asserted that the receipt of
dollars as wages weren't money income. That is what we tax-
money income. Dollars aren't money because they are but fed-
eral reserve notes with promises to pay and if you take them to
the treasury to redeem, you only get additional promises to pay in
the same greenback. And so, they do not have income and the
Tax Court had a slew of these cases and they were all being
thrown out.
And finally, the Tax Court, I think later than it should, con-
cluded that it should start imposing penalties-damages on tax-
payers who keep bringing these frivolous cases. Judge
Cannonwald, colleague of Judge Parker, had the case that an-
nounced that hereafter people who assert this will be penalized.
In the opinion, in which Judge Cannonwald finally said that this
was going to happen and these promises to pay are income; but in
any event that the taxpayer is not convinced that these promises
to pay aren't income, he should at least take solace from the fact
that he can pay the tax in those same greenbacks. So that argu-
ment won't sail very far today.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: What about imputed income?
MR. BRANNON: My point is that there should be systematic think-
ing about these things. It seems to me that systematically think-
ing about the services that a housewife contributes to the real
income of the family, would, for one thing, suggest to us that in
the area of dealing with the problems of joint/split income, et
cetera, we should be concerned with the working spouse situation
where those services are absent. And spouse allowance or mar-
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flat credit when there is unearned income involved and no change
in the service levels.
I would agree with you that there are many forms of non-
money income that are difficult to handle. But, my complaint was
these problems were not thought through and the result was that
we missed some that we should have handled.
MODERATOR: If I could just add a comment to [the audience
member's] question and the response to it. Obviously, the prob-
lem of imputed income from household services is not unrelated
to the problem of imputed income from home ownership. It's
harder to tax the imputed income from services. That's not a rea-
son, it seems to me, to not tax the much easier income from im-
puted income from home ownership. But, moreover, and this is
where I have a criticism of Treasury I-Congress did, I think, make
an important step toward dealing with the problem of household
services several years ago when it authorized the deduction of
10% (up to 10% of $30,000 a year). This was directed precisely
to the problem. Because the fact that we don't tax household
services and do tax income from the market, has at the minimum
had a very serious negative effect, particularly on women who
want to enter the market. And so, by reducing the tax on the
lower-earning spouse, we have come to equate, though still far
distance from, but have moved towards equating the exemption
of income from homeowners in order to encourage the borrower
to enter the market place. I think Treasury I made a terrible mis-
take, although I support almost all of Treasury I and would vote
for it as a package, I thought that was one clearly unnecessary
error in Treasury I.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: In assembling your excellent panel, I think
you were a little short of inviting people from the real world.
MODERATOR: That's why you were invited.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: And Judge Parker is definitely from the real
world. I'd like to say a few words about things I've heard very
little of: retroactivity and administerability. The House passed a
bill where almost everything and almost all conduct is to be gov-
erned under that bill as of the beginning of this year and perhaps
earlier. We have, of course, not the vaguest idea of what the final
legislation or final effect will be like. To the extent that this is
kind of like an in terroram tactic to deter activities that certain
1788 [Vol. 31 : p. 1787
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people in Congress don't like; one, I think that is bad policy; two,
I doubt if very many members of Congress intended it to function
that way. But I'm sure that it is functionally that way.
The other point is a temporary problem which will go away.
The other problem won't go away and it is of grave concern to
me. When we have these bills every year-or two years (at
most)-and we have new concepts introduced and they are ex-
tremely difficult concepts and Congress follows the pattern it likes
to use now (leaving almost all to regulation). First of all, it takes
an incredibly long time with regulations to get them out. Second,
there are mistakes in them when they do come out. Third, they
come out as proposed regulations and don't get fixed for more
years. The result of this is that in the practice of tax law, it is
almost impossible to advise the client. In the area of any kind of
foreign corporate transaction, I understand that there are sup-
posed to be one hundred and twenty regulations out, which I am
told are "full of surprises." But, in the meantime of a year and
half, you are not able to give much advice to the client.
The original issue of discount-like indexing, which hasn't
happened yet, and which like the § 385 regulations which went
away, the original issue-discount area was a new idea or at least an
expansion of an idea that had been kind of relatively modest for
years. I am told that the new regulations which have yet to appear
again from the 1984 Act have grown so far from 120 pages and
are growing still.
In the area of partnerships, the Treasury has just given us a
set of regulations that will require an amendment to virtually
every kind of partnership agreement that has ever been drafted
with no kind of backward time limit. Most everybody knows ...
the point is that regardless of the merits of the intriguing idea
that members of the panel have talked about, they don't work in
the real world and you can't advise clients, clients can't make de-
cisions and [the] Internal Revenue Service surely can't administer
it.
MODERATOR: In case you didn't hear it, that was a question. It
ended with "don't you think so?" Anybody on the panel like to
comment? Charles.
DR. MCLURE: I just made a note to deal with the uncertainty
question of the transaction problem and let's call it the retroactiv-
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I've written so many papers I'm not sure it's in this one, it's quite
sure that if you grandfather the purchaser of something subject to
the ITC, then that may take care of that purchaser, it doesn't do a
whole lot for the guy who has invested in machine tools to make
the equipment that would be excluded from the ITC. In other
words, you don't get there just from some grandfather of that
type. This leads me to suggest that you should phase things in
more gradually. Again, I think none of us would object a lot if we
were told "X years from now," 10 or 5 if you want, "we are going
to change the law-and be aware of it, and don't come back later
and say you didn't know about it or you didn't believe it that we
are going to change it." That's the way to deal with those
problems. You ask if we are concerned with the problem of
everything being in limbo. And the answer is yes, you have to be
concerned.
I personally think that everything from Treasury I forward, we
should have had these effective dates out far enough ahead that
certainly it would put a lot less stuff in limbo in the meantime. I,
myself, don't believe that you ought to initially create chilling ef-
fects to chill those things you don't like just because you can't get
the legal action out by the effective date. Obviously, the same
thing is true about the regulations-it is a problem. I have no
further comment.
MR. BRANNON: I would like to add to one of Charles' points in a
slightly different way. It strikes me as a wonderful way to go
about reforming the tax law would be to enact a bunch of changes
that would take place in between 1995 and 2000. My guess is that
Congress would find that too boring to work on. The only thing
that makes reform fun is the prospect of being able to tell some
people that they are going to get some whopping tax reductions.
This means that you are going to get the money from someone
else who had started a transaction depending on the old law. It is
a terrible situation, but this is the way our politics work.
MODERATOR: This business of showing effect is not new. If you
look at the 1954 Code and you see odd-ball effective dates
throughout the 1954 Code, you wonder what the effectiveness of
all those dates is. A lot of it goes to Wilbur Mills, when he was
chairman of the Ways and Means Committee. You will find a
whole series of effective dates that are tied precisely to the date
that he announced he was in favor of something. His announce-
ment date became the effective date. If you look to the 1954
1790
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Code, you can trace it back to his press release date. We are do-
ing this much less than used to be done.
MODERATOR: We are just not used to it as much anymore but they
did it because they wanted to have a chilling effect with respect to
that. Dave-any comments?
MR. BROCKWAY: Well, first in this piece of legislation, I don't
think that the administration is recommending legislation that
Congress is adopting because they think it is a good joke to play
on people and that they are trying to make life difficult for tax
lawyers. Since I've been there, with the exception of this legisla-
tion, every piece of major legislation has been driven by fiscal
concerns, not tax policy concerns. It's been driven by the fact
that before 1981 you had no indexing of the individual sectors, so
you generated substantial fiscal dividend right up through the
bracket due to inflation bracket creep so that as inflation in-
creased more rapidly you had to have legislation to plow that tax
increase into the economy to keep the same level of federal reve-
nues that you wanted from the fiscal policy standpoint. In the
process, given the natural tendency that not all that money went
back to the general public from whence it came, but it went to
whatever trendy non-tax policy objective happened to be favored
at that time. So that during the sixties and seventies you saw a
great increase in the number of tax expenditures/non-tax goals
that technically could be accomplished through the system.
In 1981, that problem was over-corrected when the bill, with
its 750 billion tax cut in five years, and indexing the tax system so
that there is no prospect of inflation growing us out of the reve-
nue shortfall. Since then (1982-1984), these three tax bills have
been the largest tax increase in peacetime history. Certainly the
1982 and 1984 bills were very large. The 1983 bill-the Social
Security Bill-was also basically a revenue increase when you
looked at how that bill was played out. These bills were driven by
revenue concerns. They were important revenue concerns, trying
to fund the government. They were probably more important, in
any event, in the judgment of the administration of Congress,
than the concerns about the instability of the tax laws. They
would obviously have increased taxes by simply increasing the
rates at the time for want of political concerns-the President said
he didn't want any tax increases.
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the largest revenue increases in peacetime history; no one would
believe, in the general public, that the President was the signer of
the three largest tax increases. There are certain political advan-
tages of changing complicated rules that you deal with, Bill, but
the general public doesn't really have much interaction with this
aspect.
Moreover, I think that people could make a fairly strong ar-
gument in those cases that if we are going to increase taxes, it
would be better to increase taxes from those who weren't paying
a significant amount of taxes in their income compared to the
ones that were. As a way of increasing taxes, what was done in
1982 and 1984 made a lot more sense as a way of increasing taxes
than a rate increase would have made at that time. The main rea-
son this bill has had trouble in being enacted is the fact that it
doesn't have a fiscal purpose behind it, to raise revenue. If it were
a revenue raising bill, and it was treated that way, and there was a
consensus that we should have a big tax increase, I think there
would be more urgency in getting it passed. But since it does not,
in its own terms, directly deal with that issue (in fact, it was specif-
ically designed not to deal with that issue), I think you don't have
that driving force. I can't tell you the number of particular busi-
ness supporters of tax reform who see tax increases coming in the
future affecting their high-effective rate tax businesses. They see
other businesses who benefitted in 1981 or who are low-effective
rate taxes, and they don't want to see a surtax coming in and rais-
ing income tax on people who are paying tax.
Those people who are paying tax end up paying more when
we have to pay a surtax. We would like to see a leveling of the
playing field first before we go to this revenue increase in taxes as
they see happening. That is why they are supporting this legisla-
tion. Again, it is a fiscal concern that they are thinking about in
that context.
Behind that, it is difficult to see change happening. It is a
problem that everybody has to deal with. But you can't say that
simply because there are problems in changing the tax law. The
difficulty you see out there, you are simply not going to respond
to.
There are a lot of problems with the current system. It is not
as fair as we would like it to be, nor as efficient as it might be. The
only way to deal with that is to change the law, and when you
change the law, there are going to be transactional effects.
Whether this is possible in a theoretical sense is another question.
1792 [Vol. 31: p. 1787
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But I think that a large portion has to do with a certain quality.
You could very well have a system to phase down the rates, to
phase out the preferences that we are going to eliminate. But
neither side of the transaction tries out the political process to
carry through with that implied promise. So that is why we get a
more direct change. It would be nicer if we didn't have to do this.
But I think the reality is that you have to do it.
One example I can think of-bad effective dates-withhold-
ing interest on dividends. Most say that was a great idea. One
thing that was said that was done wrong was to delay the effective
date for six months. This gave people time to generate a lobby
and campaign to repeal it. I'm not sure that people realize that,
under the administration proposal of the House Bill, if children
earned income, if it isn't put into an unqualified asset account (or
whatever it's called) it will be taxed at the parents' rate. The tink-
ering is to deal with the public responses. Whether the problem
is seen in formulating the policy, that is the income-shifting justi-
fying the solution.
I think there will be public reaction against those rules and
that potential public reaction is what motivates further revision of
the rules.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: What happens if you start imputing income?
MR. BRANNON: I go back to the point that Bernie Wolfman made.
In many of these areas, there can be considerable improvement
by systematically thinking about the problem. It ought very well
be that you can't impute a lot of incomes. Certainly we have
never found a feasible way to impute these house[hold] services.
If you recognize that the problem is there, you will get to a differ-
ent conclusion as to how to deal with the marriage penalty. Some
of that is a recognition of lost income from a spouse who doesn't
provide the house[hold] services. That was consistent with your
concern abut deductions-so that we did come out in a case
where you wanted deductions.
PROF. TURNIER: This doesn't deal with services but with use of
assets. Once you start proposing a tax on the imputed value of a
home, then the interest deduction becomes quite depressible.
Also, property tax deduction is perfectly depressible. Last thing,
right now you can take ACRS on your house. There was a Brook-
ings Institute on comprehensive tax rights, Don Rubins, I think,
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depreciation deductions. Once you get all this, owning a home
may be even a better deal than it is at present, from a tax stand-
point. That will depend on the depreciation you acquire.
MODERATOR: I am interested in one aspect of [the audience mem-
ber's] question because law students frequently, before they have
acquired a comprehensive grasp of the system, ask why don't we
allow a deduction for a person's services to charity, as we allow a
deduction for a person's money to charity. The answer is we do-
in not taxing the income. If you were to allow a deduction; you
would be allowing it twice. It is effectively the receipt of the value
of your services which you are then giving to charity. So you are
getting a wash. And that is true with respect to your question
about the services that are not now currently taxed. But if you did
tax the services, then of course I agree with what Bill Turnier
said-you would allow the cost as a business expense.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I have a three-prong question. From the
proposition that a tax system is only as good as the compliance
you get, a number of panelists have referred to the fact that the
income tax system won't be discarded until there is a demonstra-
tion that it is not working. The first question that I am going to
ask all three-is an income tax system working when there is 5 to
20% noncompliance? Secondly, what will 3838 do to the public's
view of the income tax? Thirdly, to bring up a question again,
what are the tax policy implications in looking for revenue in a
federal tax amnesty of some sort to bring in what is estimated to
be as much as $600 to $700 billion in uncollected interest and
penalties? I'd like to start out with Professor Shurtz. I distinctly
recollect that she pointed out that we should not abandon an in-
come tax system unless it is demonstrated that it is not working.
Dr. McClure also spoke of that.
PROF. SHURTZ: Of course, I would modify the income tax system.
I would keep the income tax system. But I would change the
present system. If the primary criteria of change is the maximiza-
tion of revenue, change it and eliminate many of the loopholes.
However, original sin would still exist with respect to imputed in-
come and unrealized appreciation. But, still, will we eliminate
medical and casualty loss, home deduction interest, state and lo-
cal taxes, et cetera? Then, I think that people wouldn't perceive it
as being unfair. I would go back to the empirical criteria that I
mentioned in the last part of my article. It seems to me that once
1794 [Vol. 31: p. 1787
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you have a tax program that is comprehensive and uses maximiza-
tion of revenue as the primary criteria, then you should use em-
pirical data to see if, in fact, we are having compliance or not. I
would first change it to the way I would want it to be, which would
be to forget the social and economic policies and concentrate on
maximization of revenue. That would be the primary criteria of
administerability, and maybe economic efficiency being next.
Then, look and see if under empirical criteria people are comply-
ing. I honestly think under my system there wouldn't be this
$600 billion underground economy, or there wouldn't be 15 to
20% of uncollected revenue.
MODERATOR: Who do you wish to impale with your second
prong?
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Dr. Brannon may have a comment on the ef-
fect H.R. 3838 will have on people's reaction to doing what they
theoretically think they will be doing when they fill out their tax
return.
MR. BRANNON: Could I take number three? Is this a multiple
choice? I don't have any opinion as to what the general attitude is
about 3838. I haven't done any survey and I don't know what
people think about this. I pass.
JUDGE PARKER: I would like to make a comment. I have abso-
lutely no basis for this. It's just my perception that we cannot
continue to disappoint the American public. They really do want
tax reform. If they are sold on the idea that this is tax reform and
then they perceive that it is not, I think the compliance problems
are going to be much more severe than they are today.
I agree that they are very severe today. It's not just the drug
money down in Miami, although that is a big part of the under-
ground economy. It is people all over the country-otherwise
perfectly decent, law abiding citizens who wouldn't take a dime
out of the collection plate at the church-but they are just simply
not reporting their income. They are not paying taxes. They're
completely off of the economy. I think it is very dangerous. I
think the self-assessment system is really in jeopardy. I think the
alarm bells are ringing. If we don't do it with tax reform soon, we
are going to miss an opportunity.
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the cynicism that the American public has about compliance is
basically engendered by a sense of congressional desire-if I can
use the word desire to tolerate non-compliance. Indeed, to en-
courage it. I think the repeal on withholding on dividends and
interest cannot be read any other way. Everybody acknowledges
that there is a minimum of $5 billion unrecorded income. Some
people suggest $8 billion. That clear way of collecting that with-
out any additional money that is currently taxable was repealed
with only four nay votes in the Senate. It shows Congress is quite
ambivalent about any will to have compliance.
I agree that we need reform and compliance, but I would be
delighted if David would respond to my observation that there is
a sense that at times Congress wants, for some constituency out
there or other, to tolerate widespread non-compliance.
MR. BROCKWAY: I guess there is a lot on the table. One, to start
off with, you use the term 15%. Someone threw out the number
of $600 billion. We should all keep in mind that no one fills out
forms saying how much tax they are not paying. None of us know
what the size of the underground economy is, or how much un-
paid tax there is. We don't know how big the problem is. But
there is a serious problem-whether we are willing to tolerate it
or whether the system is unworkable or what are we going to do
instead?
You are still picking up a substantial sum of money running
the government through this tax system. We would like to have a
better tax system for compliance. But I don't think we [can say
the] system doesn't work when you are raising some $500 billion
a year, or something in that magnitude, through the tax system.
I think that to try and improve the compliance, there are a
number of things that have been done in recent years in legisla-
tion. A lot of them are things that even earlier there is discussion
as to maybe that is going to far. They have come out with rules
that increase penalties for failure to comply or to further intrude
into peoples' lives. There is a real trade-off. We could obviously
have great compliance if we had every time anyone went out to a
business meal they had an IRS agent sitting at the table finding
out whether they are really talking about business. One could
draw all sorts of ridiculous examples.
But there is an intrusion into peoples' lives as you try and
force them to comply with the laws. You simply have a trade-off
on how you want to deal with the situation. I don't know that
[Vol. 3 1: p. 17871796
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there really is much more you would want to do in terms of com-
pliance in the tax system beyond what has been done in recent
years and some of the things that are under consideration in this
tax bill right now. There may be a number of areas that have
gone too far. Withholding on interest and dividends was re-
pealed because banks didn't like it. They financed the lobbying
campaign. There are more letters to Congress on that than any-
thing else.
You can't take the position that this really isn't reform. You
have to have a system that the public thinks is fair and then say
that the one taking that they clearly said wouldn't be fair (there is
too much of an intrusion) is withholding on interest and divi-
dends you ought to have. It wasn't Congress saying itself that you
shouldn't have this compliance mechanism. It was the public say-
ing it would rather take the non-compliance.
We got maybe two letters from world saying "yes," it was
willing to keep withholding on interest and dividends. It was an
issue that went to the average American. It was writing in droves.
Whether or not it was the banks that were financing it, it was
clearly the view of the public that this was too much of an intru-
sion in their lives. They would rather go with less compliance in
that regard.
I do think, though, that we have a very serious problem. It is
a problem that I really don't know how you can go too much fur-
ther in penalties and withholding provisions than what we have
right now in the law. We have to move to a system that the public
thinks is fair. Whether this bill does it or not, I'm not sure.
My first view is that I do think that the average person thinks
the things that are being done in this bill will respond to what
they see is the problem with the tax system. I think that they see
as the problem with the tax system the fact that there are high
profile situations of upper-income people and corporations not
paying tax. You can make all sorts of theoretical arguments why,
for example, an alternative minimal tax doesn't make any sense.
Gerry makes a very good argument of why alternative minimal
taxes make sense. It does respond to this one issue of the public's
perception of the fairness of the tax system. It would require eve-
rybody to pay some reasonable amount of tax on their income
and also reduce the taxes somewhat on upper-income people who
aren't taking advantage of the various shelters/preferences avail-
able today. I think the bill moves in that direction. It may not
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move, as remarked earlier, items like state and local tax deduc-
tions, or imputed income from home, are simply not the reason
the public thinks the current system is unfair.
Moving in those areas will not improve the public's feeling
that we had a fair tax system. Moving in the areas of cutting back
tax shelters might. You have a trade-off if you do that against
how much investment you want to encourage. Those are the ar-
eas that if you move in, you might have the public react that it is a
more fair system and potentially comply better with the tax
system.
DR. MCCLURE: For some months I was kind of puzzled why the
President kept on saying simplification. I kept saying reform.
Were we talking about the same thing? I don't know. I think
there is a sense in which those two things are not inconsistent,
that is that, I think the American public wanted simplification.
They weren't concerned only with the question of IRAs.
They wanted to simplify so that other people couldn't take advan-
tage of things that they couldn't take advantage of because their
income wasn't high enough. In that sense, simplification and re-
form are the same thing. Two different words for the same thing.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: All penalties in the world won't help compli-
ance; you will never have compliance.
MR. BROCKWAY: There is a clear trade-off. There is absolutely no
doubt about it, between whether you have sufficient resources or
services. I don't think it is simply agents out in the field. Tax-
payer services are an important across the board. If you put more
resources there you don't need to come up with some draconian
rules of forcing taxpayers to do it for themselves rather than hav-
ing the government devote sufficient resources. I don't know if
there is a very large groundswell out there in the public or an
increase in the size of the IRS.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: We don't have compliance today-what
about tax shelters?
PROF. SHURTZ: I would like to respond. I think the perception
has changed. What the average taxpayers have seen in recent
years is not the underground economy, but tradesmen who will
give you a cut if you pay them in cash. Most of us as average
taxpayers are faced with this day after day.
1798 [Vol. 3 1: p. 1787
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MR. BROCKWAY: One reason you never saw it until the post-war
period-where you had those income groups, very little if any tax
burden-because of the threshold level of filing the income tax,
you had very little pressure to avoid the tax. Beyond that, I sus-
pect we probably always did have the problem when you had cash
.wages. One reason we have good compliance is because we have
withholding where we do.
The next area we have good compliance is where we have
information reporting. Where you don't have that, compliance
drops down. I think that has always been a problem in the econ-
omy. It would be very nice to help that out-whether or not one
could repeal the deduction for all business lunches, I don't know.
The question is whether that is an appropriate level of income.
Whether you can do that, you have to make a policy decision. I
don't think you have that easy solution in dealing with the trades-
man-whether they can declare all their income.
You certainly aren't going to come up with a situation where
you want to have some sort of withholding for anytime anyone
comes out to work something out. There would be a great reac-
tion against that much complexity in people's life just to make the
tax system work. You are going to have someone out there say
that the only way to solve this is to have a system that they gener-
ally recognize as being fair so they can say to themselves, or make
it harder for them to rationalize the failure to pay by saying, "well
since these others hired Bill to get out of paying tax, I'll do it
through my self-help method." I'd think that is an appropriate
acronym for withholding. Everyone has their own justification for
their self-help in reducing their taxes. You have to come up with
a system that people believe is as fair as possible.
MR. BROCKWAY: I'm not sure in my own mind that you have a
cash economy that doesn't comply anywhere near as compelling
as in the wage sector where you have mechanics to either report
the income or withhold the income. I would be very surprised if
there were a lot of information to suggest that at one point people
very readily complied and now, they don't.
MODERATOR: I don't know anything about two-martini lunches,
but I have the impression that there is a multi-martini reception
waiting for us. Two more questions and then we'll see how many
martinis are waiting for us.
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MR. BROCKWAY: I don't think reform of the income tax system is
probably trying to get in an area of the unemployment system.
The only thing you can do with Social Security is to clear the taxes
you pay into that system and the benefits that you get out of it, so
that there might be a little more willingness to get it on the tax
rolls, and not to avoid it. But beyond that I think that it is difficult
enough with the issues before us in reforming the income tax sys-
tem without taking on that other tax, which is extremely volatile
particularly as you get into that unemployment tax area.
Again, with the increase in unemployment taxes, it is another
reason for the low- or middle-income taxpayer or the tradesman
to avoid tax. Certainly, that it why people want to be independent
contractors to avoid that tax.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Is tax amnesty a good idea? Why would a
taxpayer come forward? Would such a tax amnesty create a type
of precedence?
MR. BRANNON: There is some experience of amnesties at the state
level. What is conspicuous is that you get an initial burst of reve-
nue and then you lose some revenue in the future. Then people
begin to expect the next amnesty.
There is some research going on with respect to the relative
size of these two things. It's not clear at this point whether the
initial burst makes worthwhile the long run loss. If you're able to
convince some people that you are going to have this one amnesty,
and never again will amnesty ever come up, you'll probably make
more money on it. But it is simply not clear at this point that you
make money off of it.
MODERATOR: I am from a state that has used amnesty-Massachu-
setts. They have raised a lot of money. Our governor, for some
reason, is very positive of [about it] as other governors are. I
share a skepticism about amnesty with respect to the federal gov-
ernment for all the reasons Gerry indicated.
Moreover, I think it is true that the states haven't been good
enforcers of their taxes. They are now threatening to become
good enforcers after the amnesty. The federal government,
although we are not happy with the degree of compliance, we
have been so far away from the non-compliance of the states that
we can't even talk about them in the same breath. We have en-
forced the income tax to a significant degree and if we now de-
clare an amnesty for those who haven't complied, I think (A) you
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make a lot of people who have complied feel like schnooks and
(B) you do run the serious risk that (i) they needn't worry as much
as in the past because there will be another amnesty or (ii) it will
just be made obvious to them how many people in the past have
failed to comply.
I think better than an amnesty is the suggestion that we put
more money into the IRS and come up with a tax system that is
simpler in the sense more uniform and real substantive reform.
DR. MCCLURE: Let me add when you say "amnesty," I think that
all depends on what that means. If it means simply "put up the
back taxes..."
MODERATOR: With interest?
DR. MCCLURE: I mean without interest-then clearly those people
who are paying are schnooks. If on the other hand, it is with inter-
est, there is somewhat less than that. My own reaction is that to
try to kill something is to call it a "Banana Republic Policy," that
is really what it reminds me of here. I have seen too many places
in South America where every now and then they have the "last-
ever amnesty." It just doesn't seem to make any sense.
MODERATOR: One more question.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: What's the status of the effective dates?
MR. BROCKWAY: There is a non-binding resolution in the House
and Senate. Senator Packwood and Senator Wong, and the rank-
ing minority members Mr. Wisenkovski and Mr. Duncan sug-
gesting that they get together and work out some statement on
delay of effective dates. They have gotten together last week and
the staff has been instructed to go look at the issue and see what
impacts delaying the effective dates would have on rating so they
could make effective decisions on that.
I wouldn't expect anything to happen on that until at least a
couple of weeks. It is simply going to take some time to think
through the issue. Senator Wisenkovski has made public state-
ments to the effect that he is against the notion, at least in certain
areas, of a wholesale movement of all the effective dates. His con-
cern is a type of rush-to-market situation. Last year we had enor-
mous growths in stocks and bonds before the end of the year to
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there, you might have a lot of response to get assets acquired and
put in service before the end of this year. How to resolve those
issues, no one knows.
I am not about to predict it. They will talk through it. They
don't have any clear resolution themselves. It's all in the prelimi-
nary stage.
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